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Comments
CmmTAL LAw-CRuEL AND

UNUSUAL PuNB-iENT-CouRT

ADOPTS

TEsTS.-In 1958, two fourteen year old youths forcibly
entered the residence of a seventy-one year old woman, gagged her,
forced her onto a bed, and raped her several times in a particularly
brutal manner. Shortly after the rape, the youths were arrested and
brought before a juvenile court. At the juvenile court hearing' they
were bound over to the grand jury to be treated as adults. 2 The
grand jury returned an indictment for rape against both youths. At
the trial their court-appointed attorney entered a plea of guilty on
behalf of the defendants and the jury fixed punishment at life
imprisonment without parole.3
The defendants, after being incarcerated in the Kentucky State
Penitentiary at Eddyville, moved to set aside the judgment, and
appeal was taken from an adverse ruling on the motion.4 Held:
Although the penalty of life imprisonment without parole may be
imposed on adult offenders convicted of rape, life imprisonment without the benefit of parole is cruel and unusual punishment when
applied to juvenile offenders. Workman v. Commonwealth, 429
S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968).
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has decided many cases5 in
which appellants have asserted that penalties received in a lower
FEDEiAL

'At the hearing neither juvenile was provided counsel. On appeal it was
contended the courts failure to provide Workman with counsel was a violation
of sections 11 and 14 of the Kentucky Constitution and the sixth amendment to
the United States Constitution. The Court agreed that he right to counsel is
essential to due process at a juvenile proceeding in which a waiver of jurisdiction
is secured. But in Smith v. Commonwealth, 412 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. 1966) this
requirement, first articulated in Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541 (1965), was not given
retroactive effect. See 1967-68 Court of Appeals Review, 56 Ky. L.J. 283, 360
(1968).
2
Ky. PEv. STAT. [hereinafter cited as KRS] § 208.180 (1962) enumerates
the instances in which juveniles may be tried as adults.
3 Workman was sentenced pursuant to KRS § 435.090 (1944) which provides:
Any person who unlawfully carnally knows a female of and above 12
years of age against her will or consent, or by force or while she is insensible, shall be punished by death, or by confinement in the penitentiary
for life without privilege of parole, or by confinement in the penitentiary
for not less than ten years nor more than twenty years.
4Ky. l. Cnm . P. 11.42(1) states:
A prisoner in custody under sentence who claims a right to be released
on the ground that the sentence is subject to collateral attack may at any
time proceed directly by motion in the court which imposed sentence to
vacate,
set aside or correct it.
5
SSee, e.g., Monson v. Commonwealth, 294 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1956); Weber
v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 56, 196 S.W.2d 465 (1946); McElwain v. Commonwealth, 289 Ky. 446, 159 S.W.2d 11 (1942).

KENTUcKY LAw JouRNAL

[Vol. 58

court proceeding contravened the protection afforded by the eighth
amendment of the United States Constitution6 or section 17 of the
7
Kentucky Constitution.
The Court has traditionally held that the prohibition against
cruel punishment is directed at the legislature rather than the
judiciary.8 Consequently, no objection to judicial action is possible
if the sentence is within the discretionary limits established by the
applicable statute. 9 The defendant's only alternative has been to
claim that the statutory punishment is so severe as to be cruel,
regardless of the situation under which it is imposed.10
Since the Court has granted the legislature great discretion in
establishing penalties, this argument has been impotent."1 This is not
to say, however, that the Court has not recognized its power to declare
unconstitutional a statute imposing penalties in conflict with the
prohibition against cruel punishment. The Court has, on the contrary,
long asserted the existence of such a right,' 2 but has decided it may
be exercised only in cases where the penalty "clearly and manifestly...
appears" to be cruel.' 3
This self-imposed judicial limitation produced a situation in which
the Court never declared a statutory penalty in violation of section 17.
Even in cases where the Court found the penalty too severe in
6U.S. CONST. amend. VIII reads:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 661 (1962), the eighth amendment
was held applicable against the states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment.
Prior to Robinson the eighth amendment was not considered applicable as against
the states. See Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. 475 (1866); Weber v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 56, 196 S.W.2d 465 (1946).
7 Ky. CONST. § 17 requires that excessive bail or fines not be enacted, nor
cruel8 punishment inflicted.
.Monson v. Commonwealth, 294 S.W.2d 78 (1956). There, the Court stated:
There is no merit in the contention that the punishment is cruel or that
the fine is excessive under section 17 of the Constitution of Kentucky.
This is a constitutional limitation on the legislatur ein the fixing of punishment by statute. It is not applicable to the punishment set by a jury so
long
as it does not exceed the statutory limits. Id. at 80.
9
Bradley v. Commonwealth, 288 Ky. 416, 156 S.W.2d 469 (1941). This
case held that where an objection is directed at a sentence and not to the statute
under which it was imposed, there is no ground for reversal under section 17 of
the Kentucky Constitution. See e.g., McElwain v. Commonwealth, 289 Ky. 446,
159 S.W.2d 11 (1942); Golden v. Commonwealth, 275 Ky. 208, 121 S.W.2d
21 (1938).
1
0 See Munson v. Commonwealth, 294 S.W.2d 78 (1956); Weber v. Commonwealth,
303 Ky. 56, 196 S.W.2d 465 (1946).
1 11 In Crutchfield
v. Commonwealth, 248 Ky. 704, 59 S.W.2d 983 (1933),
the Court concluded that the legislature should determine the adequacy of
penalties necessary to prevent crime, and unless the punishment is clearly cruel,
it would
not interfere.
2
1 Harper v. Commonwealth. 93 Ky. 290, 19 S.W. 737 (1892).
13RId. at 291, 19 S.W. at 738.
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relation to public injury or individual harm produced by the criminal
act, there has been a consistent refusal to declare the penalty cruel
and unusual.14
In Workman's the Court candidly conceded 16 it had never held
an act of the legislature to be in conflict with the constitutional
provisions 17 prohibiting cruel punishment, even though the penalties
as applied were in some cases severe.' 8 The Court did, however,
reaffirm its power to declare a penalty unconstitutional if it "clearly
and manifestly appears to be so."19 Furthermore, the Court concluded
that even though the prohibition against cruel punishment is generally
directed to the kind of punishment, as distinguished from its duration,
there can be penalties so disproportionate to the offense as to constitute a violation of the prohibition. 20
Since our concept of what constitutes cruel punishment changes
as society progresses, the Court set forth three tests designed to
evaluate punishment in view of the constitutional prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. 21 The first test asks if, in view of
the circumstances, the penalty shocks the conscience and violates
fundamental concepts of fairness. 22 The second approach asks whether
14 Golden v. Commonwealth, 275 Ky. 208, 121 S.W.2d 21 (1938). There
the Court stated:
We conclude the defendant received a fair trial... and while it may be
conceded, had we constituted the jury hearing this evidence establishing
the defendant's guilt of shooting the deceased but also showing the
grievous wrongs suffered by him, shadowing and disgracing him, that
we would have been inclined to have found such evidence potent to
ameliorate the severe sentence here meted out to the appellant. However,
as the sentence imposed is within the terms of the state, Ky. St. § 1149
imposing a life imprisonment penalty for the perpetration of murder and
the jury having found that such was the degree of the defendants crime
committed, the measure of the punishment having rested solely with the
jury, we are constrained to not disturb its verdict ... Id. at 213, 121
S.W.2d at 27.
15 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968).
16 That the Court, prior to Workman, had not held a statute to be in conflict
with section 17 of the Kentucky Constitution indicates the discretion which has
been afforded the legislature in establishing criminal penalties.
17 In Workman the Court, which decided the penalty violated section 17 of
the Kentucky Constitution, did not indicate that the eighth amendment is now
applicable to the states. It did, however, adopt three tests which have been
promulgated in the federal court system and which will be discussed infra in the
text.
Is See e.g., Golden v. Commonwealth, 275 Ky. 208, 121 S.W.2d 21 (1938),
cited in note 14 supra.
19 429 S.W.2d at 377. The Court adopted the language used in Harper v.
Commonwealth, 93 Ky. 290, 19 S.W. 737 (1892) as support for this power.
20 See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1909); Weber v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 56, 196 S.W.2d 465 (1946).
21429 S.W.2d at 378. The Court enumerated the three approaches citing
several federal cases which are cited infra in notes 22, 23, 24.
22 See Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965); Jordon v. Fitzharris,
257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
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the penalty and the offense are greatly disproportionate, 23 while
the last test asks whether the penalty goes beyond what is necessary
24
to effect legitimate penal goals.
After maling these tests applicable to Workman, the Court held
that life imprisonment without parole for two fourteen year old
youths shocks the conscience and is disproportionate to the offense
committed. 25 Moreover, since the legitimate penal goal in providing
a penalty of life imprisonment without parole is to protect society
from incorrigibles, the punishment as applied to juveniles, who cannot
be classified as incorrigible, was beyond its legitimate penal ap26

plication.

Basically, Workman embodies the realization that situations arise
in which a statutory penalty, though reasonable in most circumstances, 2 7 is so severe in others 28 as to be cruel and unusual.

In

these instances, Workman holds that the statutory penalty as applied
to the offender is unconstitutional.
The Court's decision to evaluate statutory penalties in terms of
the circumstances surrounding their imposition, instead of simply
reciting the rule that a criminal penalty is valid so long as it is
within the discretionary limits established by the legislature, reflects
much humane and realistic thought. Since it was possible under
Kentucky law for two fourteen year old youths to be sentenced to
life imprisonment without parole, the need for an analysis of surrounding circumstances is obviously necessary if the prohibition
against cruel punishment is to be an effective limitation on the
legislature.
Larry C. Allen
23
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1909). There the Court observed,
"[I]t is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned
to the offense." Id. at 367.
24
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
25 The Court observed:
Rape is the only offense in this jurisdiction where punishment without
benefit of parole may be inflicted. As a philosophical matter one is caused
to wonder why this be so. It is difficult to believe that the legislature
thought this offense worse than others, especially murder. 429 S.W.2d
at 377.
26 The Court stated, "We believe that incorrigibility is inconsistent with
youth; that it is impossible to make a judgment that a fourteen-year old youth,
no matter how bad, will remain incorrigible for the rest of his life." Id. at 278.
27 The Court held that life imprisonment without parole is constitutional
when2 8imposed on an adult convicted of rape. Id. at 377.
E.g., in Workman the age of the appellants was the factor which rendered
the penalty too severe.

